The Islamic Support for the First Crusade

For his history of the Crusades Ibn al-Athir was an eye-witness, although not always a sympathetic one, of Saladin’s career, and made use of Ibn al-Qalanisi, Baha’ ad-Din and `Imad ad-Din as sources. The clarity and simplicity of his style, which avoids archaisms and embellishments and aims at presenting the essential facts, has contributed to his reputation as the chief historian of the later Crusades.¹

It has been said that the Alid rulers of Egypt became fearful when they saw the strength and power of the Saljuq state, that it had gained control of Syrian lands as far as Gaza, leaving no buffer state between the Saljuqs and Egypt to protect them, and that Aqsis had entered Egypt and blockaded it. They therefore sent to the Franks [Crusaders] to invite them to invade Syria, to conquer it and separate them and the [other] Muslims, but God knows best.²

The [Muslim] emperor of Babylon also sent Saracen messengers to our army with letters and through these he established peace and concord with us.³

Moreover, the caliph of Egypt, the most powerful of all the infidel potentates because of his riches and military forces, had sent his envoys to our [the Crusade] leaders. The reason for this embassy was as follows. For many years, a deep and inveterate enmity had existed between the Orientals and the Egyptians, arising out of differences in their religious beliefs and their opposite dogmas. This hatred has persisted without interruption to the present day. Thus these two kingdoms, often at war with one another, were in constant rivalry, each striving to extend its own boundaries and to reduce the limits of the other, as was carefully explained in the first book of this history. At different periods, according to the prowess, now of the former and now of the latter, gained the upper hand, each kingdom, with the success of its arms, expanded its territory. The result was that whatever increased the domains of one kingdom decreased that of the other.

At this period, the prince of Egypt held possession of all the country from the land of Egypt even to Laodicea of Syria - a journey of thirty days. But for a short time before the Christians arrived, as we have already stated, the sultan of Persia had seized Antioch, which lies on the frontiers of the Egyptian kingdom, and had occupied all the country as far as the Hellespont. The Egyptian monarch regarded with suspicion any increase of the Persians or Turks. Accordingly, the news that Qilij Arslan had lost Nicaea, where his army was reported to have been badly treated, and also that the Christians had laid siege to Antioch pleased him greatly. He regarded the losses of the Turks as a gain for himself and their troubles as affording peace and safety for himself and subjects. Fearing, therefore, that weariness of the long-continued siege might cause our people to fail, he sent envoys, members of his own household staff, to beg the leaders to continue the siege. The deputies were commissioned to assure the Christians that the sultan would aid them with military support and resources. They were also to try to win the hearts of favor of the leaders and to close a treaty of friendship with them.⁴

When this long siege [of Antioch] had gone on for some time, and the people had undergone very heavy punishment in terms of the burden of keeping watch, of famine and disease and frequent Turkish attacks the king amir of Egypt, because there had been very severe discord and hatred between him and the Turks long before this expedition of the Christians, and knowing the Christians’ intentions by means of a certain abbot sent as emissary, sent fifteen envoys who were skilled in different languages to the army of the living God, about a mutual alliance for peace and his kingdom, bearing this message:

The Turkish invasions from the 1050s destabilized the region, introducing an alien ruling elite backed by military coercion, causing as much if not more mayhem and disruption than the crusaders were able to achieve. (Tyerman, p. 13)

One characteristic of the Seljuks was their fiercely orthodox Sunni Islam, putting them at odds with many of their subjects, not only the various Christian sects but also the Shi'ite majority among the Muslim peasantry of Syria, as well as with the heretical caliphs of Egypt, with whom they contested control of Palestine. (Tyerman, p. 127)

The Egyptian rulers were less ideologically militant or successful, their hold over the hinterland of Syria and Palestine reduced to nominal control over a few sea-ports on the Palestinian littoral. In an attempt to eject Turkish authority from Palestine Badr al-Jamali's son and successor, al-Afdal, sought friendship with Byzantium and an agreement with the Greeks' newest allies in 1097-9. (Tyerman, p. 128)

When the emperor [Alexius I] assembled his allies at Pelekanum after the siege [of Nicaea], apart from extracting oaths from recalcitrants such as Tancred of Lecce, giving advice, discussing strategy and showering rich and poor alike with gifts, he arranged for a crusader embassy to be despatched to negotiate with the Fatimid regime in Egypt, fellow adversaries of the Turks, with whom he was on amicable terms. (Tyerman, p. 124)

By the winter of 1097-8, the resources of many of the lesser and some of the greater leaders of the [Crusader] armies were reaching exhaustion. Negotiations with the Fatimids of Egypt continued: an Egyptian embassy arrived at the crusader camp in February 1098. (Tyerman, p.136)

Some optimism for the future may have been derived from the negotiations with Egyptian ambassadors in February and March 1098 and the dispatch of Christian envoys to accompany the Egyptians back to Cairo. (Tyerman, p. 140)

Negotiations with the Fatimids continued, the Egyptian embassy at Antioch being accompanied back to Cairo by the Christian ambassadors. [...] Negotiations continued until May 1099, with Christian envoys even celebrating Easter 1099 at the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. (Tyerman, p. 149)

The Muslim world, in the same 11th century, was ridden with divisions and conflict. Muslim rulers were ready to form alliances with the foe against other Muslims. The loss of Sicily and al-Andalus was the direct result of Muslim collaboration with invading Christian forces. In the East, Ibn al-Athir says:

Since the middle of the century, Seljuk advances had been eroding the territory of the Fatimid caliphate and the Byzantine empire alike. While the Rum [Byzantine] watched as Antioch and Asia Minor escaped their control, the Egyptians lost Damascus and Jerusalem, which had belonged to them for a century. A firm friendship developed between al-Afdal and Alexius, and between Cairo and Constantinople. There were regular consultations and exchanges of information; common projects were elaborated. Shortly before the arrival of the Franj [Crusaders], Alexius and al-Afdal observed with satisfaction that the Seljuk empire was being undermined by internal quarrels. In Asia Minor, as in Syria, many small rival states had been established. Had the time come to take revenge against the Turks? Would the Rum and Egyptians now both recover their lost possessions? Al-Afdal dreamed of a concerted operation by the two allied powers, and when he learned that the basileus [king] had received a large reinforcement of troops from the lands of the Franj, he felt that revenge was at hand.

The delegation he dispatched to the besiegers of Antioch made no mention of a non-aggression pact. That much was obvious, thought the vizier. What he proposed to the Franj was a formal partition: northern Syria for the Franj; southern Syria (meaning Palestine, Damascus, and the coastal cities as far north as Beirut) for him. Al-Afdal was careful to present his offer at the earliest possible date, before the Franj were certain that they would be able to take Antioch. He was convinced that they would accept with alacrity.⁹